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Key Points for Decision Makers: 
 Performance-based financing (PBF) is influential in shaping the de facto package of care offered 
in fragile and conflict-affected settings (FCAS) , including through its influence on fee exemption 
or fee reduction policies. 
 PBF can be a factor for either coherence or fragmentation, depending on the context and the 
existing leadership and stewardship of national actors. 
 Policy-makers should use PBF to support an integrated national primary care package, with 
agreed financial access policies, rather than selective indicators and exemptions, varying by 
donors’ preferences, budget available, time period and geographical area. 
 
Abstract  
Background: As performance-based financing (PBF) is increasingly implemented across sub-Saharan 
Africa, some authors have suggested that it could be a ‘stepping stone’ for health system 
strengthening and broad health financing reforms. However, so far few studies have looked at 
whether and how PBF is aligned to and integrated with national health financing strategies, 
particularly in fragile and conflict-affected settings.  
Objective: This study attempts to address the existing research gap by exploring the role of PBF with 
reference to (i) user fees/exemption policies and (ii) basic packages of health services and benefit 
packages in Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo and Nigeria.  
Methods: The comparative case study is based on document review, key informant interviews and 
focus group discussions with stakeholders at national and subnational levels. 
Results: The findings highlight different experiences in terms of PBF’s integration. Although (formal or 
informal) fee exemption or reduction practices exist in all settings, their implementation is not uniform 
and they are often introduced by external programmes, including PBF, in an uncoordinated and 
vertical fashion. Additionally, the degree to which PBF indicators lists are aligned to the national basic 
packages of health services varies across cases, and is influenced by factors such as funders’ priorities 
and budgetary concerns.  
Conclusions: Overall, we find that where national leadership is stronger, PBF is better integrated and 
more in line with the health financing regulations and, during phases of acute crisis, can provide 
structure and organisation to the system. Where governmental stewardship is weaker, PBF may result 
in another parallel programme, potentially increasing fragmentation in health financing and 






Performance-based financing (PBF) schemes have been increasingly implemented in sub-Saharan 
Africa to improve coverage in health services and trigger positive systemic effects, by clarifying roles 
and responsibilities and improving transparency and accountability [1]. Under the PBF model 
described by Fritsche et al. [2], PBF entails a payment to healthcare providers based on their 
performance, measured by the quantity of services provided (based on a list of pre-identified 
indicators) and often adjusted by a measure of structural quality. The cash payment (or performance 
bonus) is normally used to cover facility running costs as well as individual staff incentives in a fixed 
proportion. This is typically combined with facility autonomy in deciding their use, based on a business 
plan. PBF schemes often include verification procedures to check the accuracy of the providers’ 
reports in terms of quantity, structural quality and community or client perceptions (community 
verification).  
As PBF gained popularity, an increasing number of impact evaluations have been conducted with 
mixed results [3,4], and the debate on its relevance and effectiveness continues [5]. From a theoretical 
perspective, some authors have called for broader conceptualisation of PBF as a ‘stepping stone’ for 
health system strengthening and health financing reforms [6]. In this context, it is important to gain a 
better understanding of the degree of alignment of PBF to national policies and of how PBF integrates 
with (and potentially strengthens) health financing policies at country level, or contributes to further 
fragmentation. However, so far little literature has focused empirically on the issue of the integration 
of PBF with the health financing architecture, meaning its policies and institutional set-up, in particular 
in fragile and conflict-affected settings (FCAS) where coordination is a challenge, and where a major 
evidence gap remains.  
To address this gap, this study provides a comparison across three settings (Box 1) to explore the role 
of PBF within health financing policies at country level. In particular, we focus on two key elements of 
health financing, which tend to be in place in most FCAS: (i) the user fee reduction or exemption 
policies, which reflect the broader focus on equity in access to and financing of healthcare, and (ii) the 
existing basic packages of health services (BPHS) and benefit packages, which define the services that 
health providers should make available to communities and patients and at what price. Although 
health financing strategies aimed at Universal Health Coverage (UHC) are much broader than this 
focus, the definition of a health benefit package and the reduction of out-of-pocket expenditure 
through user fee exemption or reduction policies for these services are cornerstones of any move 
towards UHC. 
This work is part of a larger body of research exploring PBF in conflict-affected and humanitarian 
settings. A literature review of health financing in fragile settings [7] noted the growing literature on 
the topic of PBF and contracting approaches in such contexts and discussed some hypotheses for their 
proliferation in these environments.  This topic was deepened by a more recent review [8], which 
tested these and more hypotheses and called for empirical study in a number of areas, including 
examining the adaptation of PBF to humanitarian settings . A comparative case study of PBF in three 
humanitarian settings highlighted the pragmatic adaptations which had been necessary for the model 
to be deployed in these challenging settings [9]. Another study examined in closer detail how PBF 
impacts on healthcare purchasing functions in three fragile case studies, and found PBF to remain an 
‘add-on’ payment method, , which had achieved some benefits but had not systematically 
transformed purchasing, as some early literature had hoped [10]. Given the high and increasing 
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number of people in need of humanitarian support, estimated at 125 million people globally [11], 
there is a growing interest in effective financing mechanisms to ensure access to healthcare services 
for conflict-affected populations [12]. In line with this, improving the evidence available on the 
integration between PBF and health financing in humanitarian and conflict-affected settings is 
particularly relevant. 
 
Box 1: Study settings 
This study was carried out in Central African Republic (CAR), the province of South Kivu in eastern 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Adamawa State in northern Nigeria. All three study 
settings are conflict-affected, albeit at different levels of intensity [9], which has heavily impacted 
the health system. These sites were selected as representing areas where PBF is being applied in 
conflict-affected settings and where the team had access. 
In both DRC and CAR, the system is organised in a pyramidal way, with primary healthcare (PHC) 
centres, secondary (district or zonal) hospitals and tertiary (provincial or regional) hospitals. 
Administratively, district health teams (called Equipes de Zone de Santé  in DRC) and regional health 
teams (Divisions Provinciales de Santé and Inspections Provinciales de Santé in DRC) manage and 
regulate the health system at different levels [13]. At central level, the Ministry of Health (MoH) 
oversees service delivery and administration but, in both countries, donors and non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) operate in parallel with varying approaches and visions in an uncoordinated 
way [9]. 
Adamawa State is one of Nigeria’s 36 states. Nigeria’s federal, decentralised structure sets it apart 
from the other settings and poses unique challenges, as in Nigeria as a whole the diversified socio-
economic, cultural, geographical and epidemiological factors add a layer of complexity that has long 
impeded efforts to overcome health system challenges. Adamawa was already less developed in its 
health system compared to other regions prior to the Boko Haram insurgency, and the conflict 
created huge damage. Despite this, the central level administration remains relatively functional 
(especially compared to the other two settings) and has taken a more direct stewardship role in the 
health reforms including PBF [9]. For long, PHC services were managed and delivered by multiple 
players. This changed in 2011 with the introduction of the “Primary Healthcare Under One Roof” 
Policy [14] whose implementation is overseen by the State MoH and a State PHC Development 
Agency . However, space for discretion and fragmentation still remains.  





The study design adopted for this research is a comparison of multiple, embedded case studies [15]. 
The advantage of such a design is that case studies allow for an exploration of a phenomenon in its 
context, particularly when, as in this case, the context is an integral part of what is being studied, and 




This study is based on two main sources of data: (i) secondary data collected through a review of 
relevant documents, and (ii) primary data collected through key informant interviews (KIIs) and focus 
groups discussions (FGDs) in the three study settings.  We reanalysed the sources which were used for 
a prior linked study, for which a standard topic guide was developed so that data would be comparable 
across the cases. The topic guide is provided as a supplementary file to that publication [9]. In the 
process of data collection, a more inductive approach was followed, whereby the topic guide was 
tailored to each group, respondent and setting to allow for contextually relevant questions, following 
up on themes that came out of previous interviews and the emergence of unexpected findings. 
Triangulation between these different sources allowed for cross-validation, contextualisation and 
capturing different dimensions of the data.  
The document search was carried out between June and November 2017 and focused on published 
and unpublished documents in each setting, including health (financing) policies and strategies, and 
basic packages of health services, as well as documents on PBF’s design and implementation (for 
example, PBF implementation manuals, list of indicators, evaluations and annual reviews). Documents 
were retrieved through the database put together for this research [8,9] and through key informants 
and direct knowledge of the context. In total, 25 documents were reviewed for South Kivu, 24 for 
Nigeria and 16 for CAR. 
A mix of KIIs and FGDs were carried out between June and November 2017. FGDs and KIIs were 
carried out in person in Nigeria (JT, NA), remotely via phone, Skype or WhatsApp for DRC (MPB), and 
a mix of phone interviews and in-person KIIs and FGDs in CAR (EJ). Participants were identified 
through the document review, by contacting the implementing/purchasing agency and/or the MoH 
in each study setting, and using a snowball technique by asking interviewees to suggest others. 
Participants’ selection was purposeful and aimed at being as comprehensive as possible, although 
not all levels of the health system are included in all settings.. Since the KIIs and FGDs mainly served 
to check policy and programmatic details, recall bias was a risk in some cases. Therefore, depending 
on the questions we felt different respondents could answer and the opportunities that we 
encountered, a choice was made between an individual KII or a FGD. The choice to conduct a FGD 
was in some cases also made to take advantage of existing opportunities, such as meetings that 
were already organised which gathered relevant stakeholders. In total, 34 KIIs and 18 FGDs among 
stakeholders at various levels of the health system were carried out as shown in Table 1. The KII and 
FGD data were mainly used to triangulate information from the document review and did not focus 
on eliciting the perceptions, individual opinions or experiences from the respondents. 
 
Table 1 should be inserted here. 
Data analysis 
KIIs were recorded and/or detailed notes were taken during interviews and FGDs. Interviews and FGDs 
lasted between 45 and 120 minutes. Data analysis was carried out deductively based on framework 
approach [17] by manually coding and extracting information from documents and detailed interview 
notes based on a list of predefined, descriptive themes (provided in annex 1), approved by all authors, 
which focused on (i) PBF features (history, design, institutional arrangements); (ii) PBF and user fee 
exemption/equity mechanisms (health financing regulatory framework, equity bonus, effectiveness 
of implementation, degree of integration of health financing policies); (iii) PBF, BPHS and benefit 
packages (national BPHS, official benefit packages, list of services included in PBF at different levels, 
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PBF’s role in the de facto implementation of BPHS). A three-country matrix was created with input 
from all authors to summarise the information and to compare and contrast findings across the 
settings, identifying emerging patterns and differences, which are described in the findings section 
below. 
In terms of positionality, all authors have (at different levels in each country) in-depth knowledge of, 
a network of contacts and perceived legitimacy in the respective settings where they collected data, 
based on previous work. However, we remain ‘outsiders’, as in not local to those contexts. Our ‘mixed’ 
positionality brings advantages in terms of retaining autonomy vis-à-vis decision-makers [18] and yet 
being close enough to access documentation and key informants [19]. On the other hand, in our 
analysis we remained aware and reflective of the geographical distance and the exploratory and short-
term nature of this specific study. For example, we are cognisant of the externally-defined nature of 
the research questions we set out to explore and our deductive approach to the interpretation of the 
finding. 
Findings 
Detailed information about PBF’s adoption, design and implementation in the three study settings is 
provided in an earlier paper [9]. We focus here on the key PBF features in relation to the specific 
research question, looking at the integration of PBF within the health system, in particular in relation 
to user fee exemptions and BPHS. Box 2 provides background on the PBF programmes in each setting. 
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  Box 2: Key PBF features in the three countries 
In South Kivu, PBF was implemented starting in 2005-2006 by the Dutch NGO Cordaid. The 
programme initially covered two health zones [55] and was later expanded to five others between 
2008 and 2012 [28,29]. PBF included facilities at primary and secondary levels in the public, private 
and faith-based sectors, as well as the Equipes de Zone de Santé and (later on) provincial health 
authorities, and provided around 2-3 USD per capita [55,56]. In terms of institutional arrangements, 
an independent purchasing agency (Agence d’Achat des Performances, AAP) was created and was 
responsible for signing contracts, verifying the quantitative indicators, undertaking the quality 
verification alongside the zonal and provincial health teams and coordinating the community 
verification which is done by contracted Community Based Organisations. The AAP was also the fund-
holder, making payments to facilities and health authorities. As PBF was implemented and rolled out 
in South Kivu, the Plan National de Développement Sanitaire (PNDS) 2011-2015 [13] was the main 
regulatory document for the health sector, but it did not refer directly to PBF. 
In CAR, PBF has been implemented since 2009 through a series of pilots, also led by Cordaid. Since 
the first pilot, PBF has been explicitly aligned to the Plan National de Développement Sanitaire 2006-
2015 (PNDS 2) [57] to improve the provision of basic healthcare. At the time of this study, the two 
main projects are ongoing. One is funded by the European Union (Fonds Bekou), which is a trust fund, 
specifically designed for (post-)crisis situations, and implemented by Cordaid since 2015 with a 
budget of around 11€ per capita, and the second is the World Bank-funded Projet d’Appui au Système 
de Santé (PASS) which started in 2016 (budget around 4 USD per capita). Two international agencies 
(Cordaid and AEDES) are in charge of implementing the PASS project in different areas, under the 
coordination of a Project Implementation Unit within the MoH. In both PASS and Fonds Bekou 
projects, the implementing agencies are responsible for contracting primary and secondary facilities 
across all sectors, verification and purchasing. In the Fonds Bekou project, the implementing agency 
is the fund-holder and payer, and is also responsible for contracting health authorities at district, 
regional and national level, while under the PASS project, contracting of regulatory functions is done 
within the MoH in a hierarchical way and the Project Implementation Unit is the fund-holder and 
payer [34].  
In Nigeria, PBF was introduced in 2012 with funding from the World Bank (14 USD per capita) in three 
pilot states, i.e. Adamawa, Nasarawa and Ondo. The PBF model was adapted to the local context, 
particularly the decentralisation of the Nigerian federal system, and was designed in line with, and in 
support of the “Primary Healthcare Under One Roof” Policy [14]. In each State, a project 
implementation unit was created within the State PHC Development Agency and was responsible for 
purchasing, contracting and verification. In contrast with the other settings, the unit functioned as a 
purchasing agency embedded in a national structure and the State Ministry of Finance had the fund-
holding and payer role [42]. Some adjustments to the initial design were made in the insurgency-
affected areas and the neighbouring districts which hosted the displaced populations. For example, 
nearby facilities used PBF funds to sub-contract newly set-up outreach clinics operating in camps for 
Internally Displaced People (IDPs) and overall PBF systems and structures appear to have helped set 







User fee exemption mechanisms and PBF 
Formally committed to the goal of UHC, DRC, CAR and Nigeria have all in general terms proclaimed 
the need to strengthen access to healthcare through increased financial risk protection in their 
national health plans [20–22]. However, in terms of health financing and equity mechanisms, both 
DRC and CAR do not have official national policies in place envisaging concrete exemptions from user 
fees, and the national reference documents, thePlan National de Développement Sanitaire (PNDS) and 
health sector transition plan, for both countries are not explicit about this. As shown in Table 2, 
household out of pocket payments amount to around 40% of total health expenditure in CAR and DRC, 
and out-of-pocket payments are even higher in Nigeria. 
Table 2 should be inserted here 
In the DRC, the PNDS stipulates that ‘national solidarity mechanisms’ should be developed, such as 
community-based health insurance, flat payments instead of fee-for-service-based user fees, and 
third-party payment mechanisms or equity funds [13]. In practice, several of these measures are 
implemented in an ‘informal’ way in some areas of the country but remain localised and externally-
led. For example, unofficial exemption policies exist for most preventative services (e.g., vaccination) 
which are de facto free and provided under a vertical approach [23]. Similarly, NGOs have experiences 
implementing programmes which include partial exemptions, equity funds for indigents or the 
introduction of flat fees [24]. Additionally, during acute crisis phases, humanitarian NGOs often 
introduce free care (total exemptions) for their catchment populations. These policies usually only last 
during the emergency phase and are found to be difficult to align with longer-term development 
approaches adopted by other external partners operating in those same areas, as exemplified by a 
case of Shabunda Health Zone in South Kivu in 2009 [9,25]. 
In CAR, the national user fee policy was modified during the height of the crisis in 2014. At the time, a 
policy of free healthcare for women (covering perinatal services), children and loosely defined 
‘emergency’ services was instituted nationwide and implemented with external funding through all 
the different programmes and projects operating in the country [26]. However, this policy appeared 
to be a temporary emergency measure and was scaled down in stable areas, although it is in theory 
still in place in the most insecure areas (KIIs/FGDs).  
Key informants described how, in Adamawa, in 2012 the Governor at the time declared maternal and 
child health services to be provided free of charge in the state. However, this policy has not been well 
implemented. The government initially provided free drugs for the services covered in order to 
support the exemption policy. However, this soon led to a large increase in service demand and 
facilities ran out of the drugs, which led them to charge for exempted services again. The policy was 
then abolished and no (selective) free care policy was in place anymore at the time of research. A 
national insurance scheme exists but applies only to federal government workers [27]. 
PBF operated against this regulatory background, and in all three contexts PBF programmes 
introduced their own fee exemption mechanisms in addition to, or in the absence of national policies 
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on the matter. However, the methodology for selection of beneficiaries varied, and their effectiveness 
was often unclear.  
In South Kivu, while overall PBF aimed at a reduction of user fees for all patients in agreement with 
the facilities and the local Health Committees, fee exemptions were initially not included in the PBF 
design. However, a mechanism to exempt the very poor (or indigents) from user fees through an 
equity fund (with reimbursement of payments waived by the purchasing agencies) was later 
introduced [28]. Nevertheless, subsequent project evaluations noted that these mechanisms were 
largely not functioning and not having the desired equitable effects [29,30]. Additionally, in terms of 
equitable resource allocation between areas, little was done as there was no ‘equity bonus’ available 
to support more isolated and remote facilities (including those in conflict-affected areas) [28]. The 
equity bonus is a mechanism often introduced to increase the PBF envelope available for certain 
disadvantaged areas. More successful were the exemptions introduced for Internally Displaced People 
(IDPs) during times of acute crisis. In such times, the PBF design was adapted in order to allow facilities 
to provide free health care to IDPs by increasing the PBF bonus paid for services to them, while user 
fees continued to apply to local residents. This allowed providing free care to about 20,000 IDPs [25], 
and this model later served as example to other settings, including CAR [9,31–33]. 
In CAR, a mechanism to exempt indigents from paying fees is in place under the Projet d’Appui au 
Système de Santé (PASS) programme, and health facilities receive compensation for the lost income 
as each indicator has two levels of bonus attached – a lower one for general patients, and a higher 
one for indigents [34]. However, selection of indigents is left open to communities to decide, without 
standardised criteria. Under the Bekou project, at the time of research around half of health facilities 
(those located in crisis-affected areas) still fell under the ‘total free care’ directive that was declared 
in 2014. For the other health facilities, a policy of targeted free care for maternal, neonatal and child 
health as well as indigents was in place [26]. Similar to the mechanism under PASS, Cordaid provides 
‘equity bonuses’ to compensate for lost income to vulnerable groups (KIIs/FGDs). 
In Adamawa State, PBF guidelines stipulated the introduction of fee exemptions for the very poor for 
outpatient consultations only. However, the identification of the very poor is done by the facilities, 
which have little incentive to exempt them. In crisis-affected areas, all care was provided for free to 
registered IDPs by the newly-created outreach clinics in the IDP camps by providing additional funding 
to the facilities [9,35]. In contrast with the example of Shabunda (South Kivu) above, in Adamawa 
State, the State Primary Healthcare (PHC) Development Agency in charge of purchasing PHC, provided 
essential leadership that enabled the coordinated response of humanitarian, development agencies 
and government, which were able to effectively share tasks (some providing in-kind support and 
others channeling funds to facilities via the PBF programme) and avoid duplication (KIIs/FGDs).  
 
Basic Packages of Health Services, health benefit packages and PBF 
An essential or basic package of health services (BPHS) is defined as a selection of cost-effective 
services and interventions that a government has identified as priority and aims to provide to the 
entire population. On the other hand, a health benefit package (or simply, benefit package) specifies 
an explicit set of services (usually a sub-set of the BPHS) and the cost sharing requirements for 
beneficiaries to access those services [36], often  within specific schemes. BPHS play a critical role, 
especially in FCAS where health interventions and funding are multiple and fragmented, to help 
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establish clear priorities, provide a sense of direction for all the intervening agencies and harmonise 
development partner activities [7,37,38]. At the same time, the World Health Organization stresses 
that it is essential that health benefit packages (i.e., who is entitled to what services, and what, if 
anything, they are they meant to pay at the point of use) are clear and explicit, that the population is 
informed about them and that the promised benefits are aligned with provider payment mechanisms, 
so that providers are in the position to actually offer those services [39].  
Similar to fee exemption, national health plans in all of the three countries mention benefit packages 
as one of the instruments in realising UHC, but their scope and applicability appears to vary. In DRC, 
regulations for the basic package are defined in the Minimum Package of Health Services (Paquet 
Minimum d’Activités, PMA) for health centres operating at primary level, and in the Complementary 
Package of Health Services (Paquet Complementaire d’Activités, PCA) for secondary hospitals [40]. 
However, the PMA and the PCA are defined broadly, and (as explained above) most services listed are 
subject to user fees [41], with variations across areas and services, depending on donors’ and NGOs’ 
interventions. Consequently no clear, single benefit package in DRC exists and benefits vary across 
areas and individuals (depending on their employment and other factors) [36]. The situation is similar 
in the CAR where PMA and PCA exists, but benefits are fragmented and unclear (KIIs/FGDs). In Nigeria, 
the official BPHS includes 20 indicators at primary care level (Minimum Package of Services, MPA) and 
21 indicators at secondary level (Complementary Package of Services, CPA) [42]. However, this is not 
matched in the actual benefit package as most services are charged for and health insurance covers 
only a small population share, so that benefits remain fragmented, depending on individuals’ 
entitlements and resources [27].    
In such contexts, by defining a list of indicators for which a payment (or bonus) is provided, PBF 
indirectly shapes the benefit package as facilities are encouraged to remove or reduce fees for those 
services. In South Kivu, PBF indicators were chosen based on the broad BPHS as defined by the MoH . 
However, the list of indicators as well as the bonus attached to each (which did not cover the full costs 
of providing the service, but only a portion to incentivise increased coverage) varied over time 
depending on the budget available and the funder(s)’ preferences, and only rarely were all services 
included (KIIs). The situation was similar in CAR, where the indicator list included in PBF programmes 
is based on the national BHPS, although not all services are included. There have also been efforts to 
harmonise the list between PASS and Fonds Bekou PBF programmes so that it is now common for the 
two, although payment rates differ between the programmes (KII/FGDs). In contrast, in Nigeria, the 
PBF pilot was meant to fund PHC services and therefore covered all services included in the BPHS. 
However, in the areas affected by the insurgency in Adamawa State, the list of indicators covered by 
PBF for the pre-existing facilities was reduced to include only 7-8 high-impact interventions from the 
MPA and the list of indicators for the newly created and subcontracted mobile clinics in the IDP camps 
was even more limited to five key interventions (antenatal care, deliveries, outpatient consultations, 
growth monitoring and immunization).  
 
Discussion 
Our analysis provides evidence on PBF’s integration within and impact on health financing policies, 
focusing on three FCAS settings and two particular aspects, which are interconnected. However, the 
study has limitations and our findings are exploratory. The study draws on interviews whose number 
11 
 
is relatively limited, due to availability and accessibility of respondents. Due to resource constraints, 
we could not record and transcribe all KIIs and FGDs. Data from these sources was mainly used to 
triangulate and contextualise information from the document review, to better understand the policy 
processes and not to elicit the experiences or perceptions of respondents. Some degree of respondent 
bias is possible because respondents were identified through contacts provided by implementing 
agencies. Although we captured the views of the MoH, and other governmental and non-
governmental organisations, the sample is unbalanced towards those involved in PBF implementation, 
and we did not capture the views of the communities they serve. Additionally, some of the interviews 
were carried out remotely and we have not yet developed local research partnerships in all countries. 
Despite these important limitations, our research provides a first empirical analysis of the issue of the 
integration of PBF with two health financing policies, focusing on FCAS where coordination is a 
challenge, and where a major evidence gap remains. 
Free health care or fee exemption policies were common across the study settings, especially during 
acute crisis phases. However, they were often ‘informal’ (i.e., not defined by the central government) 
and their implementation was not uniform in time, across geographical areas and in terms of benefits, 
based on external partners’ presence and preferences, and on the availability of funds. As exemptions 
or fee reductions (including PBF-related ones) were introduced locally and in an uncoordinated 
fashion, they resulted in tensions on the ground between actors adopting different approaches [8]. 
The resultant patchwork mirrors the implementation of user fee and benefit package guidelines that 
was observed in Tajikistan [43]. Moreover, exemption policies for the very poor introduced by PBF 
remain only partially successful often due to issues with beneficiaries’ identification, as also confirmed 
by other countries’ experiences [44,45]. Our analysis also highlights that, although BPHS may be 
helpful in setting priorities and aligning support to health services [38], they were often too broad, 
and there was little or no effort to link BPHS with effective and clear benefits. In practice, selective 
support to specific services still determined the degree to which patients and communities could 
access health services. In this context, PBF programmes indirectly shaped the benefit package by 
defining a list of services for which a payment is provided and fees reduced or removed. However, 
often payment was linked to a limited number of interventions within the BPHS. Since rarely, across 
the three cases, the payment attached to each indicator covered the entire costs of providing that 
service (but rather a partial subsidy to incentivise service coverage), an argument could be made to 
subsidise the entire national BPHS, in order to promote better alignment and avoid leaving some 
services un-incentivised. However, under this approach concerns may exist about the level of 
payment, which would have been too low to represent a real incentive (especially in projects such as 
the one in South Kivu where budget per capita was overall low). Ultimately, it appears that the degree 
to which PBF service packages were aligned to the official national package of services varied across 
cases, and was influenced by factors such as development partners’ priorities, coordination among 
external actors and budgetary concerns during PBF implementation. Only in Adamawa State (in non-
crisis-affected areas) did we note a substantial alignment of BPHS and PBF indicators (although not all 
BPHS services were included as PBF indicators), so that PBF contributed to standardise and improve 
the provision of primary care, even if outside of a free care policy.  
In general, and perhaps unsurprisingly, our findings suggest that PBF is better integrated and aligned 
with health financing regulations where governmental leadership is stronger and where it is designed 
to fit pre-existing national structures. This was evident in the case of northern Nigeria where PBF is 
approached as a tool to channel funds for PHC, and remained so during acute crisis phases, providing 
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structure and organisation to the system. This is not dissimilar to the case of Burundi where PBF is 
integrated with, and in support to, the national free health care policy [46]. In more precarious 
governance settings, with a weak regulatory environment and leadership such as the DRC and CAR, 
PBF remains implemented ‘vertically’ and (external) implementers can shape health governance, 
financing and service delivery as a de facto policymaker [9]. It must be noted that in the three cases 
we explored, PBF was implemented (at the time) as a pilot programme, rather than a national policy. 
This has implications and might in part explain why PBF has not been fully integrated with other 
policies [47,48]. However, given that the policies we considered are cornerstones of the health 
financing architecture, PBF programmes, even at pilot stage, should arguably have been designed to 
incorporate those principles. When this is not realised, and especially in the contexts where 
governance and government’s leadership are particularly weak,  there is the risk of PBF  operating as 
a parallel programme, potentially increasing fragmentation in health financing in general, as well as 
between areas supported by different donors. Our findings on the risks of fragmentation and parallel 
implementation are in line with the broader literature on health financing reforms aiming to reach 
UHC. For example, Richard et al. [49] looked at maternal health care fee exemptions introduced in 11 
countries of sub-Saharan Africa as a first steps towards UHC and stressed the necessity of embedding 
such exemptions in a national framework to avoid further health financing fragmentation. Looking 
specifically at PBF, our findings are consistent with work which was recently done on the impact of 
PBF on strategic purchasing in FCAS settings, which highlighted the importance of context – 
particularly the degree of stability and authority of government– the design of the PBF programme, 
and the potential for effective integration of PBF in existing systems as key factors behind differences 
in strategic purchasing effects noted [10]. They also reinforce a growing interest in the role of actors 
and the political economy of PBF and health financing policies more generally; recent studies highlight 
how ideology, interests and networks shape the adoption and implementation of PBF, especially in 
FCAS settings, given capacity and funding asymmetries, which in turn affect not just access, equity and 
financial protection (i.e. the realisation of UHC), but also the material interests of the health system 
stakeholders [50–53]. Finally, our findings are relevant to a wider debate about the role of PBF and 
relative importance of different mechanisms within it, including whether its main function is really to 
incentivise change or (especially within FCAS settings) to channel funds to under-resourced primary 
health systems [50,54].   
 
Conclusions 
Integration of PBF within the existing health financing mechanisms remains crucial to ensure long-
term improvement of comprehensive and equitable service delivery. In particular, caution should be 
exercised with a long-term focus of performance-based financing on a small selection of indicators to 
avoid distortion of the delivery of a de facto benefit package and support the delivery of an integrated 
national primary care package. Secondly, creating parallel PBF programmes may weaken existing 
health financing mechanisms, or impede their development. Instead, the overhaul of the provider-
purchaser-regulator relationship that PBF usually entails should be used as an opportunity to reform 
and strengthen existing structures and policies, such as harmonisation of fee exemption policies and 
aligned benefit packages. 
Overall, we find that where national leadership is stronger, PBF is better integrated and in line with 
the health financing policies and, during phases of acute crisis, can provide structure and organisation 
13 
 
to the system. Where governmental stewardship is weaker, PBF may result in another parallel 
programme, potentially increasing fragmentation in health financing and inequalities between areas 
supported by different donors. These findings have important policy implications to ensure that health 
financing interventions in fragile and humanitarian settings support not just immediate equitable 
access to health care but also longer term health system strengthening and institution-building. 
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